Introduction
In this paper we collect data which allow us to estimate employees'Willingness-to-Pay (WtP) for nonpecuniary bene…ts. The aim of our study is threefold: to empirically investigate whether the expected trade-o¤ exists, and whether or not there are any signs of sorting. In addition to demonstrating the trade-o¤ between pay and individual fringes and amenities, we also examine the extent to which employees di¤er in their WtP for nonpecuniary bene…ts. This information is important for employers in deciding on the design of compensation packages. Furthermore, our analysis informs us about di¤erences in the WtP for di¤erent "quantities" of the fringes. Lastly, this
paper also seeks to demonstrate that this relatively simple tool-kit can be used in larger organizations or across smaller enterprises, and may assist managers in putting together more e¢ cient compensation packages, given any special needs they may have. E¢ ciency is a cornerstone in personnel economics (Lazear and Oyer, 2010) , and the vignettes method has the potential to provide companies with a tool to detect possible ine¢ ciencies and hence to increase pro…ts.
The inclusion of nonmonetary bene…ts and job amenities as important parts of employees' compensation packages has proliferated across many countries in recent years, see e.g. Society for Human Ressource Management, Annual Reports. From an economic perspective providing nonmonetary bene…ts can be rational behavior on the part of both employer and employees for three reasons. First, exploiting scale economies employers can sometimes acquire these goods at a lower cost than single employees. Occasionally, the fringe bene…ts may also be taxed less heavily than income from work.
Second, including nonpecuniary bene…ts in compensation packages can also act as a sorting device to attract and retain key employees (Oyer, 2008) .
Still a third way of thinking about nonmonetary compensation, common in industrial psychology studies, is to consider nonmonetary rewards as status and identity aspects of a job or position, and as complementary rather than as substitutes for monetary rewards (Milkovich and Newman, 2010) .
Given the prevalence of bene…ts it is natural to ask how employers should 2 use fringe bene…ts and nonmonetary rewards. Should they use cafeteria plans, that is, o¤er their employees a menu of possible bene…ts? Or should they apply more precisely targeted bene…ts? The hedonic model of compensation (Rosen, 1974) , provides a useful analytical framework to understand the relevant mechanisms.
In designing its compensation policies, including nonpecuniary bene…ts, the …rm faces two choices. The …rst choice is to select bene…ts that provide incentives for workers to perform better, i.e. productivity enhancing bene…ts, such as pension systems that encourage human capital investments or working time ‡exibility arrangements which lower employees'cost of e¤ort.
The di¢ culty here is that since bene…ts are costly, the employer needs to weigh the productivity gain to the increase in costs. In this setting, a tradeo¤ arises as the hedonic model predicts a negative trade-o¤ between wages and nonmonetary rewards like ‡exibility, home-pc or company car.
The second choice is about …nding combinations of pay and nonmonetary bene…ts that attract the kind of workers the …rm desires. How many and which kind of nonmonetary bene…ts the …rm will o¤er is consequently the outcome of the interaction of workers'preferences, the …rm's cost structure and desire to attract speci…c types of labor. The key insight o¤ered by the hedonic model is that fringe bene…ts and nonmonetary compensation can be used actively as a sorting device. Carefully designed, a compensation package may induce the type of applicants, which the employer wants, and concurrently screen-out applicants that do not …t the desired pro…le of the workplace.
Although these principles are widely recognized as e¢ cient behavior by rational agents, there is relatively little empirical evidence.
First, it has proven rather di¢ cult to provide evidence of the trade-o¤ between monetary and nonmonetary bene…ts predicted by the hedonic utility model, Brown (1980) , Duncan and Holmlund (1983) and Gronberg and Reed (1994) , Oyer (2008) . The main reason for the di¢ culties involved is that it is virtually impossible to gather …eld data that allow for this type of estimation. Consider the sort of data needed to test for a negative tradeo¤ between bene…ts and pay. Not only should we observe an employee's current compensation package in the job she has chosen, and she has been chosen for, but we also need to observe alternative o¤ers she may have received. Moreover, one needs to control for the employee's observable as well unobservable skills as these are likely to be positively correlated with both the monetary and nonmonetary rewards received by the employee. Obviously, neither register nor survey data are likely to contain this information.
Using job o¤ers given to postdoctoral biologists, Stern (2004) provides one important exemption for the lack of suitable data, and …nds that, indeed, scientists do pay to be scientists.
Second, there is even less evidence available on the extent to which compensation packages serve as sorting mechanisms. The seminal paper by Salop and Salop (1976) focuses on di¤erent forms of compensation as a means to induce the most productive workers to join the …rm. Oyer's (2008) theoretical model is concerned with the use of bene…ts to sort employees based on their tastes. His empirical analysis, which is based on individuals'selfreported bene…t eligibility information (NLSY), shows that employees who are likly to value certain bene…ts (employer provided meals and dental and health insurance) more, are employed at …rms providing them.
A key novelty of this paper is the type of data we exploit to estimate WtP for the nonpecuniary aspects of compensation packages. We use survey data and ask respondents to choose between two …ctive jobs described in so-called vignettes. The vignette method has earlier been used extensively in other …elds but rarely in labor economics. Early studies appeared in marketing research Rao 1971, Green and Srinivasan, 1978) , while transport economics (Ben-Akiva et al., 1993) , and environmental and resource economics (Adamowicz et al., 1998) are examples of disciplines within the economic realm that have used this approach. In labor economics, van Beek et al. (1997) also make use of vignettes although their objective di¤ers from ours. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst time vignettes are applied in the context of eliciting individuals'Willingness-to-Pay for fringe bene…ts.
The personnel economics literature has contributed to a better understanding of a wide range of questions related to human resource management practices, such as teamwork, promotions, incentive pay and the use of fringe bene…ts; see Lazear and Shaw (2007) , Oyer and Schaefer (2010) for recent overviews. If it can be shown empirically that there is a negative trade-o¤ between nonmonetary rewards and wages, and that sorting does matter, this will be an important …nding as it implies that all the models in personnel economics apply not only to monetary rewards but also to nonmonetary rewards.
Previewing our main …ndings, they are brie ‡y as follows. First and foremost, we …nd clear evidence of negative wage-fringe bene…t trade-o¤s.
Moreover, the analysis documents large di¤erences in how individuals value fringe bene…ts. We …nd considerable di¤erences in willingness-to-pay for fringe bene…ts both within and between demographic groups. When comparing individuals'willingness-to-pay for speci…c bene…ts with whether they receive them in the jobs they currently hold, we observe fairly strong positive relations suggesting that employers use compensation packages as a means of sorting of their employees.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In the next section we brie ‡y discuss the hedonic wage model. Section 3 includes a description of vignettes and the sample of respondents are given. Section 4 presents the econometric method employed and the …fth section gives the empirical results. Section 6 contains a discussion of the economic implications of our …ndings and section 7 concludes.
The Hedonic Compensation Model
The hedonic compensation model described in Rosen's (1974) seminal analysis focuses mainly on the cost side of fringe bene…ts and job attributes. The key trade-o¤ in the analysis is between bene…ts and pay, i.e., the balance between o¤ering more bene…ts and less pay. In the simplest possible model, workers are assumed to have identical preferences regarding bene…ts. As these, like wages, are goods, the trade-o¤ can be described by means of a downward-sloping convex indi¤erence curve in bene…t and wage space.
Once a …rm knows the slope of the indi¤erence curve it can choose the correct combination of wage and bene…t o¤ers.
Allowing for heterogeneous preferences, that is, acknowledging the fact that di¤erent individuals place di¤erent weights on bene…ts and wages, makes things more complicated. A simple example is o¤ered by Lazear (1998) and reproduced in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 about here] Imagine two employees: one is a chess player during his leisure time and the other likes to windsurf. Windsur…ng depends on the weather and the windsurfer therefore places more value on ‡exible working time vis-à-vis the chess player. This is shown in Figure 1 where the windsurfer is more willing to trade-o¤ wage earnings for ‡ex-time compared to the chess player.
Thus, hedonic compensation theory tells us that willingness to pay for fringe bene…ts and job amenities varies with employee type, and that …rms can try to make the workers it desires self-sort as employees to the …rm by choosing appropriate wage-bene…t combinations. be employed, i.e., we exclude students, self-and unemployed.
work minimum 30 hours per week in her main occupation. not be employed in the primary sector, e.g., in farms, …sheries. not be a CEO or a top level manager.
An invitation to participate was sent out to 10,000 members of the re-spondents panel; 6,300 responded of which 3,094 matched our selection criteria.
Given this screening procedure it is not surprising that the …nal sample contains relatively many highly educated respondents -more than 50 percent have 3-4 years of college or higher education. 2 The corresponding share in the overall Danish population is about 25 percent. Consequently, the mean gross monthly income is also high, about 35,000 DKK (6,400 USD) as compared to the population mean of about 22,000 DKK (4,000 USD). 3 The female labor participation rate is high in Denmark; nevertheless, the 51 percent female share in the sample is also above the population share of 47 per cent females in the workforce. In the econometric analysis we limit the sample to individuals who work between 30 and 73 hours per week.
The Vignettes
Although the intuition is clear -there is likely to be a trade-o¤ between fringe bene…ts and wages -it has proven very hard to verify this claim empirically. A data-predicament arises from the fact that we rarely observe employees'compensation packages and we virtually never observe what they alternatively could have chosen, i.e. their outside options.
Here, we solve this problem by building vignettes, in which respondents are o¤ered a series of …ctive choices between two alternating jobcompensation packages. Faced with two job-compensation packages, A and B, the respondent is asked to choose one for the other and this exercise is repeated 7 times per respondent, each time with di¤erent values for the variables that characterize the job-compensation package.
To ‡esh out the idea further, consider the example given in Figure 2 below. A vignette in the left column includes all attributes describing the job. These attributes do not change between vignettes but their values change between choice situations. This yields variation in the data that allows us to identify parameter values. In order to induce a high degree of variation in the possible combinations 70 di¤erent vignettes were applied.
See Appendix B for further details on the introductory text and attribute levels.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In the example given in Figure 2 , the respondent may choose Job A in which she is o¤ered a complete health insurance -something the alternative, Job B, does not o¤er. However, opting for the health insurance comes at a cost since Job B o¤ers a higher wage (5% more than Job A), 5 days of training per year and ‡exible work hours. In the example, two of the attributes, "Home-pc + ADSL internet" and "Annual bonus (equivalent to one month's pay)" are held constant across the two alternatives. In other vignettes these could vary while, typically, one or more of the other attributes would then be held constant.
Data Description
For the purpose of this paper we are especially interested in the amount of fringe and job amenities each employee receives in her current job as we examine whether there are any signs of sorting. About three out of four respondents, 73 percent, did not receive a bonus in 2008, see Table 1 Table 2 . The most common and least costly fringes are free co¤ee and fruit, whereas the most costly, company cars, are relatively rare (only 4 percent). 4 Employer provided training is among the job amenities investigated in this paper. As can be seen from Table 3 , about 15 percent never received training while an additional 25 percent had not received employer provided training in the current year, but had so in previous years. Among respondents who received some training in 2008, most had been in training for less than two weeks. 5
[ Table 3 about here]
Econometric Framework for the Hedonic Model
The starting point for estimating Willingness to Pay (W tP ) for job attributes is a simple utility function, U ,
where utility from alternative j in choice situation t for individual n is given by equation (1). is a parameter vector and x is a matrix that includes vignette characteristics and background variables interacted with vignette characteristics. The coe¢ cients n are distributed with density f ( j ), where refers to the mean and covariance of . The error term " njt is assumed to be iid extreme value distributed over time, people and alternatives. This is the mixed logit model with a continuous mixing distribution, 4 Most prevalent in the "other" category are "free lunch", newspaper, employee shares and products from the company.
5 These numbers are very much in line with those found in a major Danish survey conducted in 2006, see Trepartsudvalget (2006) . The share of employees in the entire population who never received training is higher than 15 percent since employees with no high school degree (not included here) tend to have a relatively lower training propensity.
see Revelt and Train (1998) , Train (2003) , which can be estimated using simulated maximum likelihood. The coe¢ cient vector can be expressed as n = b + n ; where b is the population mean, and n is individual n's stochastic deviation from the average in the population. The estimated utility function can now be expressed as U njt = b 0 n x njt + 0 n x njt + " njt : The stochastic part ( 0 n x njt + " njt ) can be correlated over alternatives and time, and therefore this model allows for very general patterns of substitution between alternatives. 6 An estimate of the Willingness-to-Pay is usually obtained by dividing a parameter for a given characteristic with a cost parameter; see Revelt and Train (1998) . In this application, we use the wage-parameter as the implicit "cost". The idea is to estimate W tP for nonmonetary rewards, which in turn enables us to answer questions of the following type: How much more of, say, ‡exibility should you have in order to be fully compensated for a wage decrease of the magnitude of 5%? 7 The mean W tP for ‡exibility is computed as
We estimate mean and standard deviation of the WtP for all vignette attributes. However, to ease the computational burden, we only estimate mean e¤ects of all interaction terms between vignette attributes and observable characteristics. 8
Results
We …rst present results from estimation of a simple conditional logit and compare these with parameter estimates from a mixed logit, see Models (1) and (2) in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here]
The mean coe¢ cients of the mixed logit model are generally higher than the estimated parameters from the conditional logit model. 9 The fact that the magnitude of the di¤erences in many of the estimated parameters is about a factor of two indicates that the random parameters explain a lot of the variance in unobserved utility. Indeed, with the exception of "Bonus with 25% chance", we …nd that all random parameters are highly signi…cant, and that their estimated coe¢ cients are relatively high compared to their mean values.
All coe¢ cients have the expected positive sign. 10 This has the important implication that there indeed is a trade-o¤ between the nonmonetary bene…ts and the wage.
One key advantage of vignettes is that respondents are faced with similar choice situations. However, in this study the vignettes describe …ctive jobs and the wage is described relative (in percent) to the respondent's current wage. Answers to a question about the respondent's own wage subsequently enabled us to estimate the model. Obviously, this approach requires that we control for respondent's own wage. This is implemented by introducing an interaction term between each of the vignettes and an indicator for whether or not the respondent's own wage is above or below the median wage in our 9 The unobserved variation contained in "njt is much larger in the logit model. Hence, in order to normalize "njt to have the appropriate variance of an extreme value distribution it has to be normalized by a higher value in the logit model compared to the mixed logit model. As the -parameters are normalized by the same value as ", this normalization explains the di¤erence in the values in the two models.
1 0 In Model (2) there is one exception in "Bonus with 50% chance", which is insigni…cant. Once we control for the respondent's own wage, as in Model (3), the coe¢ cient for this parameter becomes positive and highly signi…cant.
11
sample, see Model (3) in Table 4 . 11 As expected, it is relevant to control for the respondent's own wage. Notably, ‡exibility, …ve days of training and pc + internet are valued signi…cantly higher among respondents in the top half of the wage distribution. The increased log-likelihood also indicates a better …t of the data. 12 The estimated random coe¤cients are assumed to be normally distributed. This implies that, while most respondents may place a relatively high value on the various vignette attributes, there is a proportion of the respondents who place a negative value on the attribute. By de…nition, the assumption of normally distributed random coe¢ cients yield WtP-estimates where the sign changes across the distribution of respondents since the normal distribution is de…ned from minus in…nity to in…nity. Alternatively, the random coe¢ cients could be assumed to follow some other known distribution, like the log-normal distribution, which is de…ned from zero to in…nity.
Hence, with the log-normal assumption we impose a restriction that ensures that all individuals place a positive value on the attribute.
[ Table 5 about here]
The results from this sensitivity analysis, see Table 5 , indicate that both the mean value and the standard deviation change only little. In addition, the log-likelihood value is virtually constant. Although the log-normal assumption is appealing, it does not come without a cost. The lognormal distribution exacerbates the problem in the right-most part of the distribution (as it has a thicker upper tail). In addition, it is often very hard to obtain convergence with the log-normal assumption imposed. In the fol-1 1 Arguably, this is a rather crude manner to control for income. It is chosen here because it facilitates interpretation of the results. Introducing own wage as a continuous variable or using dummies for quantiles makes little di¤erence.
1 2 In all three models of Table 4 the coe¢ cients are estimated under the assumption that they are independently and identically distributed. However, the simple mixed logit model in column (2) of Table 4 has also been estimated allowing for correlated random coe¢ -cients. This speci…cation is much more computer-intensive and thus greatly increases the computational burden. The estimated mean coe¢ cients (not shown) rise somewhat, which again re ‡ects that this extension to the model captures more of the variance. However, the ratios between coe¢ cients, the WtPs, change much less.
lowing, we therefore continue with the assumption of normally distributed random coe¢ cients but note that one needs to interpret the results with due caution, especially in the tails of the distribution. 13 In the following, the speci…cation of the model is extended with a series of observable covariates that intuitively, one could think are linked to the utility of one or more of the nonmonetary goods described by the vignette attributes. Given the high number of parameters to be estimated we do not allow the coe¢ cients to be correlated. 14
Willingness-to-Pay for Nonmonetary Job Attributes and Fringe Bene…ts
One of the key insights from the hedonic utility model is that individuals di¤er in their valuation of nonmonetary rewards. We therefore extend the model speci…cation by interaction terms between vignette characteristics and indicator variables for female, good physical health (self-reported), age 57 or above, children below age 6 in the household, low level of education, and an indicator variable for long commuting time between home and work.
The estimated coe¢ cients are given in Table C2 Based on the coe¢ cients in Table C2 we can compute WtP for the vignette attributes; these are shown in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 about here]
1 3 This precaution is necessary for any distribution one may chose. The basic issue is that an unrestricted distribution necessarily gives implausible results for some share of the population. This issue is described in detail by Revelt and Train (1998, footnote 14 pp. 655-656) .
1 4 The computational burden simply becomes insurmountable given the number of observations and the number of parameters.
13
The mean WtP for both health packages and for both levels of ‡exibility is quite high. In particular, it is probably not realistic that respondents would be willing to pay almost 400 USD/month for "Some ‡exibility", although ‡exibility often is given a very high priority, Bender et al. (2005) . 15 It seems likely that there is some degree of "hypothetical bias"here, whereby respondents "o¤er" to pay more in hypothetical choice situations compared to their true preferences revealed through real out-of-pocket purchases, List (2001) . 16 However, having accounted for this possibility we may also note that the other parameter estimates appear quite plausible. For instance, the cost of internet (ADSL) and a home-pc would amount to about 100 USD/month, which is in line with our mean estimate, and the value of one month's bonus multiplied with the chance of receiving it is, on average, lower than our 25% estimate but higher than our 50% estimate.
One advantage of the mixed logit is that the willingness-to-pay can be given a graphical presentation, which facilitates interpretation and especially serves to underscore the importance of the entire distribution of WtPs. Figure 3 demonstrates that, while the mean WtP for ‡exibility is estimated to be around 400 USD per month, respondents do place very di¤erent values on ‡exibility, and the distribution consequently becomes very wide. Not surprisingly, the distribution is widest for the high level of ‡exibility. As one could expect, some employees value ‡exibility a lot while others pay little attention to this job characteristic. This is in line with the chessplayerwindsurfer argument given in Figure 1 . We return to heterogeneity in the next section.
[ Figure 3 about here]
As discussed above the normality assumption implies that a share of 1 5 Given our selected sample of relatively high educated, the 400 USD corresponds to about 6% of the average earnings of 6400 USD. This appears very high.
1 6 "Hypothetical bias" is a well-known problem in the contingent valuation literature. It refers to the experience from several studies that individuals in hypothetical situations tend to bias their intentions upwards as compared to their choices in real action situations. the respondents have a WtP below zero. These shares are given in the second column of Table 6 . 17 Arguably, such shares have to be interpreted pragmatically and with caution as they are, at least to some degree, an outcome of the assumed normality.
Heterogeneity in Individual Preferences
In personnel economics models, the provision of bene…ts and nonmonetary job attributes is motivated by rational behavior and e¢ ciency as …rms are trying to attract the types of workers they desire. It is, therefore, of interest to examine how the willingness to pay for fringe bene…ts and job amenities varies across individuals with di¤erent observable characteristics.
The parameter estimates for several of the interaction-terms reveal signi…cant di¤erences in WtP for the fringe bene…ts and job amenities included in our model and most of them appear intuitively plausible. For instance, women value ‡exibility and employer provided training signi…cantly higher than men, see Table 7 . This is in line with a general …nding that women participate in training more often than men (Trepartsudvalget, 2006) [ Table 7 about here] Flexibility is also valued higher by high-wage earners, the older part of the workforce and by respondents who have children below 6 years of age.
One could hypothesize that employees with relatively long commuting times also would value ‡exibility more. However, respondents in our sample generally commute relatively short spells (the 75th percentile is 35 minutes) and 1 7 Given the random coe¢ cents are assumed normally distributed, the share below zero can be computed as 100 (
where () denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution, b k the mean estimate and k the estimated standard deviation.
commuting time is not found to have a signi…cant impact on respondents' WtP for any of the job amenities and fringe bene…ts. 18 The elderly part of the workforce values bonuses and the possibility of having employer-provided home-pc and internet access signi…cantly lower than their younger peers. Age, on the other hand, does not appear to have a signi…cant impact on the value attributed to health packages or employer provided training. Especially the latter result is somewhat surprising as elderly workers cannot reap bene…ts from training over as many years as their younger colleagues. 19 An employee characteristic which is not observed in our data, but is likely to in ‡uence individuals'choices of compensation packages, is risk aversion.
A growing, mainly experimental literature has shown that females are on average more risk averse than males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) , and there is also evidence of risk aversion increasing with age (Barsky et al., 1997) .
According to the interaction term estimates there is no signi…cant gender di¤erence in the willingness to pay for bonuses. However, for the elderly respondents we do …nd that they value bonuses signi…cantly less positively (in fact even negatively) than younger employees.
The observation that the older part of the work force does not value health insurance signi…cantly higher than the average respondent is also somewhat surprising. Notice here that physical health is included as a control variable, and that "old"include respondents up to 64 years of age only.
Finally, we may note that the "less educated" in our sample, i.e., respondents with a short college degree or less, value the longest training signi…cantly less than respondents with a higher education. This is consistent with lower returns to training among low educated as a result of complementarity in skill acquisition; see e.g., Cunha and Heckman (2007) .
Furthermore, highly educated individuals are likely to obtain more utility from time spent in training.
Compensation Packages as Sorting Devices
A key insight from the personnel economics literature, see e.g., Lazear and Shaw (2007) , is that fringe bene…ts and job amenities can be used by employers as an instrument for sorting employees. While the argument is intuitively persuasive, there is little empirical evidence to support it.
It is di¢ cult to test for sorting also within the setup of this paper.
However, we may …nd indications of sorting if, for instance, individuals who receive more training also are found to have a higher willingness to pay for training. In general, if sorting is important, we would expect to …nd that the WtP for a given bene…t is higher among employees who currently receive the bene…t in question than among those who do not.
[ Table 8 about here]
We do …nd suggestive evidence of sorting, see Table 8 . All interaction terms with the respondent's situation in her current job attach positive parameter estimates although not all of them di¤er signi…cantly from zero.
The indications of sorting only appear for relatively high levels of health insurance, ‡exibility and training. This is intuitively appealing since sorting arguably is more likely to arise if the magnitude of the fringe or amenity provided exceeds a certain threshold level.
It is important to emphasize that the results in Table 8 do not prove the occurrence of sorting. An alternative explanation may be that in certain occupations it simply does not make sense to provide an employee with a home pc and internet to perform the job tasks (a bus driver for example).
In this case, it would be erroneous to conclude that the di¤erences in WtP indicate that employees actually sorted, since "sorting" allude to the idea that they chose their current job over another "similar" job, which did not o¤er the bene…t or job attribute in question.
In order to investigate this a bit further we re-estimate the model for speci…c sub-samples. Most job openings relevant to our selected sample of respondents would include some degree of ‡exibility and some amount of on-the-job training. However, "pc + internet" and the health packages are mainly o¤ered to speci…c groups.
First, it is likely that individuals with relatively low levels of education are in jobs where the use of home pc and internet connection is of little relevance. Such employees likely place a lower value on home pc and internet as a fringe bene…t and in addition, they are less likely to have been o¤ered such a compensation package. Indeed, when estimating the model on a subsample of respondents with minimum some college education, the di¤erence from the average WtP-estimates for "pc + internet" drops from an extra 307% (Table 8 ) to 141%. This remains a very high increased willingness to pay. Sorting may explain some of this di¤erence.
Second, the use of health packages is very common in the private sector, but not in the public sector. In our sample, 3% of the public sector employees state that they receive some type of health package. The corresponding number among private sector workers is 64%. Hence, signs of sorting should mainly be found by comparing private sector workers with some type of health package in their current job to other private sector workers with no health package in their current job. This comparison yields a di¤erence in the willingness to pay for the large health package of 26%, compared to 44% in Table 8 . The di¤erence remains insigni…cant for the small health package.
Albeit no ultimate proof, the sub-sample estimates still provide indications of sorting.
Discussion
Our mixed logit analysis shows that there are fairly large di¤erences between individuals in how they value various fringe bene…ts and that there are clear trade-o¤s between wages and fringes as predicted by hedonic wage theory. Moreover, we …nd that the willingness to pay for speci…c fringe bene…ts di¤er between demographic groups. For instance, females, employees with children under school age and elderly workers place a higher value on working time ‡exibility. Obviously, this has some implications both for policies for balancing work and family life as well as for increasing labor force participation among elderly workers.
Furthermore, when there is a choice between di¤erent quantities of the fringe bene…t, the di¤erence in willingness to pay for the larger quantity does not -save training -di¤er from that for the smaller quantity. This may be interpreted as indicating that the bene…ts to some extent are conceived of as gifts or as signals that the employer is concerned about them and the employees are willing to reciprocate by paying for them; see e.g., Baron and Kreps (1999) , pp. 302¤, for a discussion. Note, that the notion of a bene…t as a gift depends crucially on which motives the employer is considered to have for providing them. Unlike training, which is likely to be considered by the employee to bene…t the …rm more directly, working time ‡exibility and a health insurance package are conceived of as meeting special needs of the employee, and therefore, the willingness to pay for them does not vary with the amount o¤ered.
The considerable heterogeneity in individuals'tastes for the various fringe bene…ts could be interpreted as support for use of cafeteria-style compensation plans, according to which the employee can choose between a number of bene…ts within a given budget set in advance by the employer. However, use of cafeteria plans makes it di¢ cult for employers to utilize fringe bene…ts as an employee sorting device. Our analysis in section 5.3 above provides some suggestive evidence of employers using fringe bene…ts as a means of sorting workers. This in line with Oyer (2008) who looks at whether employees likely to value a fringe bene…t are more likely to also receive it, whereas we compare the employee's willingness to pay for a bene…t with its presence in her actual compensation package. Our result underscores that sorting is more than a theoretical construct and that indeed, people do respond to nonmonetary rewards.
The vignettes method also has the potential advantage that it can be used not only for research but also has a potential for helping employers in designing compensation packages for their employees. However, as our exercise has demonstrated the method also has a number of potential limitations worth pointing out. One is that the number of mixed parameters to be estimated has to be kept fairly low otherwise the computational burden grows very fast. A weakness of the method one needs to be aware of is that the estimates may be upward biased because of the hypothetical bias problem.
However, relative valuations between types of nonmonetary rewards as well as between individuals with varying characteristics should not be a¤ected by such bias. Our results concur with this rationale as they generally show the expected relative di¤erences.
Conclusion
Previous studies of fringe bene…ts have focused primarily on the cost side.
The idea is that when the employer can acquire the fringe goods cheaper than the employees or when they are associated with a tax arbitrage, the likelihood that the value of a fringe bene…t to an employee exceeds the …rm's costs of providing it is higher. The focus in this paper di¤ers insofar that we examine directly individuals'valuations of the fringe bene…ts by estimating their willingness to pay for them.
For this purpose we make use of a method, building vignettes and merging them with survey data, which is new within this area of research. This allows us to solve some of the problems that have plagued the earlier literature, like unobserved heterogeneity in ability, di¤erences in tastes for di¤erent fringe bene…ts and the selectivity due to non-randomness of job changes.
All in all, our …ndings lend strong support to a key notion in the economic analysis of employment relationships, that nonmonetary job attributes can be monetized. As emphasized by Lazear and Shaw (2007) Monthly wage before tax -As in current job -As in current job +/-5% -As in current job +/-10% -As in current job +/-15% Appendix C: Additional Tables   Table C1  Means 
